My notes from presenting the case law update at the 2017 Advanced Workers' Compensation Seminar in Austin.
Case Law Update
2017 State Bar of Texas Advanced Workers’ Compensation Seminar
Alan D. Tysinger
Course and scope of employment, Issues vs. arguments, Statutory violation
Martinez vs. State Office of Risk Management, 04-14-00558-CV (Tex.App.-- San Antonio 2016), petition granted.
Martinez sustained injuries at home on June 9, 2001. She was an employee of the state of Texas, working overtime on the weekend at home to get documents prepared for court hearings the following Monday. She slipped and fell in her kitchen when going to retrieve a pen for her work. She filed a claim, which was denied by SORM. She lost CCH, then prevailed on AP review. SORM filed suit for judicial review.
This case has been up on appeal, back to the trial court, and now up for appellate review again. This time around, SORM filed an MSJ, which was granted, Martinez challenged this on appeal, asserting that SORM had now on judicial review raised a new issue, that of a “statutory violation” regarding Martinez’s work from home activities. SORM asserted that because a statute prohibits such working from home without prior written authorization, an injuries sustained as a result of such work are necessarily non-compensable.
Martinez argued that this constituted a new issue, one not adjudicated through the administrative process, and was therefore out of bounds for consideration by the trial court. The COA reversed and remanded this case for further development in light of its determination that the statutory violation argument was properly cognizable as a distinct issue and not a position or argument subsumed within the compensability question itself.
Note that this can present significant challenges for practitioners as the line between argument and issue is blurry. One way of understanding this is that the reason the issue vs. argument question becomes so thorny is that a party-- here, SORM-- wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, for procedural purposes, SORM wants to say that this is merely an argument within the issue of compensability.
On the other hand, however, SORM wants to argue that this is an entirely dispositive legal matter with its own distinct provenance outside the TWCA. It would seem this is the source of the conflict. SORM does not treat the statutory question as evidence ofactivity outside the course and scope. It treats the statutory question as itself a violation, which precludes a finding of compensability. In other words, by inflating the value of the argument, the court fairly finds that it is necessary to treat such a weighty question as something that should have been addressed by the Division in order for the court to properly review the AP decision. The TXSC has granted the petition for review in this case.
Coverage, Standing, “Aggrieved party,” Course and scope of employment, Wrongful death
New Hampshire Ins. Co vs. Dominguez,15-40539 (5thCir. 2016).
A widow instituted a wrongful death action arising out of a commercial bus crash. The decedent was an employee of the bus company who was not the driver, but was on the bus at the time of the injury. The bus crashed and the workers’ compensation carrier sought to affirm coverage and compensability of the death so as to foreclose the wrongful death action. The widow contested coverage and whether the decedent was in the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident. The parties proceeded to contested case hearing. The DWC determined the decedent was in the course and scope of employment at the time of injury and death, but there was no coverage. The employer was not listed on the policy at the time of the injury.
The carrier filed suit for judicial review of the AP decision. Trial court granted MSJ for carrier against widow on course and scope. Trial court sua spontedismissed carrier appeal of coverage issue as carrier was not an “aggrieved party” and lacked standing. Fifth Circuit affirmed on course and scope (the evidence showed that although the decedent was not driving that date, he did work activities on the bus, assisted the driver by resolving a seating issue with the passengers, attempted to assist the driver regarding the malfunction leading up to the crash, and attempted to steer the bus), but reversed and remanded for further development of the standing issue:
NHIC asserts that it is aggrieved because the DWC's decision allegedly resulted, inter alia, in the possibility of NHIC's having to refund Americanos's insurance premiums and in forfeiting the workers' compensation benefits it paid to the bus driver as a result of this accident. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to determine, based on all the facts and a comprehensive review of the case law, whether NHIC has standing to seek judicial review of the DWC's "no coverage" determination. We do not reach the question whether NHIC's retroactive coverage of Americanos was enforceable.
A few interesting items for consideration.One,this is an illustration of how the DWC system and the exclusive remedy provision may be used by either claimants or carriers as to gain an advantage in other related litigation.Second, this case leaves unresolved the issue of retroactive coverage. The employer was not listed on the policy and this appears on the surface, without knowing the underlying record, to have been an oversight.The reference in the opinion to retroactive coverage seems to indicate that the carrier was willing to rectify this error and provide coverage retroactively, notwithstanding the actual language on the policy documents in effect at the time of the injury.
The court leaves unresolved the legal significance of this, but one may note that the Texas Supreme Court has indicated a strong policy preference for workers’ compensation coverage and has rubber stamped affirmations of coverage arising in some cases years after the fact when personal injury litigation is involved.
Declaratory Judgment, Ultra Vires, Sovereign Immunity
Morales vs. Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation, 03-14-00808 (Tex.App.-- Austin 2017).
Jailhouse lawyer case
This was a standard injury case that went into judicial review for IR issues primarily. Morales lost after CCH/AP determination of IR and filed suit for judicial review. Included as defendants were the TDI-DWC and Commissioner under theories of declaratory judgment as to the validity of DWC interpretation of statutes. Trial court granted plea to the jurisdiction as to TDI-DWC/Commissioner. COA affirmed, characterizing Morales’ claims as not involving the validity of any statute, but simply a determination of his rights under the Act, and that his ultra vires claim failed as the doctrine does not extend to claim that DWC reached an “incorrect result when exercising its delegated authority.”
The holding affirms the notion that the DWC is not a proper party to almost any suit for judicial review. This is probably the right outcome, but leaves parties with some tension in not being able to directly confront the architects of bad interpretation directly, but rather only the opposing party with substantial deferance being accorded to the administrative agency in interpretation of the statute and rules.
45 day filing, Statute of limitations, Plea to the jurisdiction, Tolling
Chicas vs. Texas Mutual Insurance Company,01-16-00226-CV (Tex.App.-- Houston 1stDist. 2017).
Bertila Chicas claimed beneficiary status for Santiago Chicas, who died in an accident while cleaning the rain gutters at the home of his employer’s president. This was not, apparently, part of normal job duties but there was some question as to whether the decedent was in the course and scope of employment. The widow sought workers’ compensation benefits and had also filed a wrongful death action in probate court in Harris County.
She lost CCH/AP review and amended the petition in Harris County Probate court to include a claim for judicial review. The probate court dismissed her judicial review claims and she re-filed in Harris County district court. Texas Mutual filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming 410.252(a) is jurisdictional and the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction due to the original amendment to the petition in probate court being dismissed and the subsequent suit being untimely.
The COA discussed case law addressing the distinction between “mandatory”/“right to relief” and “jurisdictional,” ultimately holding that the 45 day filing requirement is not jurisdictional. The COA noted inconsistencies among the state COA’s on this question, with some holding that it is jurisdictional (often without interaction with the TX SC case law on jurisdiction) and others. The COA held that the 45 day filing provision is mandatory, but not jurisdictional, and as it is not jurisdictional, the case should be remanded for determination of whether 16.064 of the CPRC applies to toll the limitations period-- which it strongly hinted in a footnote that it would.
This seems to be a rare case where whether to characterize the issue as jurisdictional may be dispositive. The courts have universally held that filing within the 45 day time period is required and no relief may be granted if that is not complied with. This seems to be a largely semantic issue created by jurisprudence in the area of jurisdiction that will affect finality of judgments, and not so much an issue that in most cases would enlarge the time period or excuse an incorrect filing.
The distinction the courts are making is that the 45 day time period for filing suit is mandatory and necessary in order for the plaintiff to have a right to relief, but regardless of whether the 45 day period is complied with, the court has the power to speak (juris-diction) on the subject matter of the lawsuit. Yet the only power the court would be able to speak into the lawsuit if the 45 day deadline is not met is to deny the requested relief.
Plea to the jurisdiction, Sovereign immunity, Designated doctor
Harlan vs. Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation,01-14-00479-CV (Tex.App.-- Houston 1stDist. 2016).
Harlan lost CCH/AP review of MMI/IR issues and sued the TDI-DWC, designated doctor, carrier, and hearing officer. Trial court granted plea to the jurisdiction as to TDI-DWC, designated doctor, and hearing officer. COA affirmed; state agency has sovereign immunity, designated doctor has statutory immunity as acting in good faith and no allegation to the contrary, and hearing officer acting within discretion also had same sovereign immunity as agency.
The only really interesting issue here, other than perhaps some relief for hearing officers and DWC employees generally, is the issue of designated doctor immunity. The language here used does really nothing more than track the statutory language regarding such immunity, but the language is so mild as to perhaps invite suit in some cases where there is a palpable disregard for the DWC requirements demonstrated in the report itself so as to constitute some evidence of bad faith on the part of the doctor.
Exclusive remedy, Uninsured/Underinsured motorist coverage, “Legally entitled to recover”
Soledad vs. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company,03-16-00203-CV (Tex.App.-- Austin 2016).
Soledad sustained injuries in a MVA caused by her co-employee. She and the co-employee were in a vehicle and the co-employee was driving at the time of the accident. She had her own UM/UIM coverage and filed for workers’ compensation benefits as well as benefits under that policy. Her carrier denied her claim, alleging she was not “legally entitled to recover” from her co-employee, and therefore coverage was not triggered under her policy.
Trial court granted MSJ for carrier and COA affirmed. Under the exclusive remedy provision of the TWCA, Soledad would be legally barred from recovery against either the owner of the vehicle, her employer, or the driver, her co-employee. The court did not address other potential issues that may thwart attempted recovery by the plaintiff, but certainly affirmed that there will be cases where the employee can recover under her UM/UIM policy.
Impairment Rating, Evidence of Impairment, Remand to DWC
American Zurich Insurance Company vs. Samudio, 01-15-00478-CV (Tex.App.-- Houston 1stDist. 2016).
This case has quite a tortured history, involving ascent to the TXSC and remand already. Samudio originally received an IR under the now-defunct “Advisories” issued by the DWC instructing doctors to consider a spinal fusion as a “loss of motion segment integrity” under the AMA Guides, 4thEdition. While there is some medical rationale to this concept, it was not in any sense derived from the text of the Guides themselves, nor was it promulgated through the rulemaking process. It was an example of the agency “going rogue” in terms of its legal directives.
Ultimately the TXSC threw out the advisories. The TXSC authorized the trial court to remand the case to the DWC in the event that it determines no valid IR was presented to the DWC that could be adopted by the court. Following remand to the trial court, the carrier sought to have the trial court determine there was no adoptable rating and filed a motion for summary judgment.
The basis for the motion was the original IR was stated by DD to have been based on the advisory only. This motion was pending when Samudio died. Samudio’s estate substituted as party, filing MSJ. Samudio presented an affidavit from the surgeon in support of its claim that the IR was ultimately consistent with the Guides. Samudio’s MSJ was granted.
The COA held that there was no valid IR presented to DWC. New evidence (affidavit by surgeon stating compression fracture >50%) was not presented to DWC and was not admissible (likewise COA found deposition testimony of DD proferred by carrier was not presented to DWC and not admissible). The only evidence remaining to be considered was the original set of documents from the designated doctor, which all stated the IR was calculated in terms of the advisory.
The case would then seem to be headed for remand to the DWC for determination of the rating using the Guides.Interestingly, this will then seem to open the door for the new evidence submitted by each side, such as the surgeon’s affidavit and the deposition testimony of the designated doctor, to be submitted-- but as Samudio has now passed, no other examining doctor will be able to certify a rating.
Death benefits, Abandonment of spouse, Affirmative defense, Burden of proof
Liberty Insurance Corporation vs. Tarango,11-15-00123-CV (Tex.App.-- Eastland 2016).
Benny Tarango died in the course and scope of employment. Mary Ann Tarango sought beneficiary status as the surviving wife. The carrier disputed her eligibility on the basis of abandonment for more than one year prior to death. Tarango lost CCH/AP review and filed for judicial review. After a bench trial, judgment was entered that Tarango is a proper beneficiary.
This case is interesting because of some of the procedural issues. The trial court found the abandonment issue to be an affirmative defense, and placed the burden of proof on carrier that abandonment had occurred. COA held that because the TWCA places the burden of proof on a party challenging the AP decision, and here that was Tarango, Tarango had the burden to disprove abandonment, and the case was remanded.
This is another case where the “issues” versus “arguments” distinction comes into play, as there was discussion as to the limits of any evidence/argument on the abandonment question as it was not pleaded by the carrier, but the COA noted that the abandonment issue was specifically pleaded by the Plaintiff in her petition as having not occurred, or having occurred with good cause, and it was found that the issue was litigated by the parties.
As to the burden of proof issue, the difficult question to understand after this decision is how, as to the abandonment question, the Plaintiff/claimed beneficiary would have moreof a burden of proof in judicial review on a subject (beneficiary status) than she had at the administrative level, where she also had the burden of proof. Cf. Sec. 410.303. BURDEN OF PROOF. The party appealing the decision on an issue described in Section 410.301(a) has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.But arguably the claimant/beneficiary pleaded into this situation by pleading no abandonment?
Subrogation, Waiver of subrogation, Right of reimbursement, Third party recovery
Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company vs. Wedel(Tex.App.-- El Paso 2017, pet. filed).
This case involves a waiver of subrogation as to third party recovery. Contract between Cactus Transport and Western Refining stipulating that Cactus would obtain workers’ compensation coverage with waiver of subrogation. Wedel, employee of Cactus, sustained injuries and sued Western. Western and Wedel settled, with Wausau as carrier for Cactus asserting claim for proceeds of settlement.
COA 1) disagreed with Wausau that subrogation and right of reimbursement are to be considered distinct concepts as to the contractual waiver, essentially holding they are two sides to the same coin 2) Wausau’s argument that this defeated the statutory scheme failed because this was a matter of contract 3) Wausau’s arguments that it was seeking recovery not against the party liable to Wedel for his injuries, but from Wedel, who was not named in the contract, defies both the language of the contract and how the courts have construed these agreements in the past. Please note the distinction in the Robertscase below regarding how these contracts may be construed.
Maximum allowable reimbursement, Federal pre-emption of TWCA fee guidelines
Texas Mutual insurance Company vs. PHI Air Medical LLC,1:16-cv-00387-SS (WD Tex. 2016).
Federal district court, on removal from Texas state district court, held that TWCA’s limitation of 125% Medicare fee applied notwithstanding Federal airline deregulation. The provider was arguing, among other things, the ability to bill and balance-bill above TWCA fee guidelines due to pre-emption of TWCA by federal airline deregulation statute.
Third party recovery, Subrogation, Attorney’s fee calculation, Jury trial on fees
Harris County vs. Knapp,01-15-00052-CV (Tex.App.-- Houston 1stDist. 2016).
Knapp was an employee of Harris County who was injured by a third party’s negligence in a motor vehicle accident. Knapp settled with the third party and a dispute arose with Harris County regarding the proceeds. Knapp’s attorney asserted that the 36% attorney fee contingency contract was primary and any issue regarding the lien came after that. Knapp sought declaratory relief. Harris County claimed governmental immunity as to alleged liability for attorney’s fees on the part of Knapp’s counsel.
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and the trial court granted Knapp’s. COA held that Harris County had no governmental immunity as to the claim for attorney fee deduction from its recovered lien. While governmental immunity will generally apply when a party claims monetary damages from a governmental entity, that was not the case here. This was an offset and not an independent claim for monetary damages.
COA identified proper formula for calculation of payout. Carrier lien is to be deducted from gross settlement before applying contractual contingency fee calculation. Carrier lien is then reduced by appropriate attorney fee per statute and proportional expenses. Remaining amount above lien is resolved pursuant to contract with plaintiff.
As to jury trial on fees, court held that no jury trial on fees was not reversible error as there was no dispute as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees, only as to the calculation under the statute.Interestingly, this was in spite of the fact that the carrier asserted at the trial court that its own counsel had materially participated in the litigation, which would seem to implicate the reasonableness of the fee and its apportionment, but the trial court and COA seemed to give this argument no weight, perhaps because the underlying facts in support of that were quite thin.
Subrogation, Waiver of subrogation, Third party recovery
Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania vs. Roberts, 506 S.W.3d 498(Tex.App.-- Houston 1stDist. 2016) (pet. filed)
Two contracting parties, Exxon and Savage, had a contract specifying mutual waivers of subrogation and mutual indemnity agreements for damages caused to the other’s employees. An injury occurred to an employee which resulted in a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, a third party action, and questions about subrogation and waiver of the subrogation interest. Trial court granted MSJ on waiver of subrogation.
COA reversed. Although there was a waiver of subrogation in the contract, under the facts of this case and the contract, there was language that this was limited to situations where it “assume[d] liability,” which was understood by COA to mean that the waiver of subrogation language only applied when Savage indemnified Exxon for its own negligence, and the waiver of subrogation is not triggered when Exxon or Savage negligently causes injury to the other’s employees.
So in this case, rather than being a pure waiver of subrogation, the contract and policies were structured so as to pair the waiver of subrogation with an indemnity agreement, effectively offsetting the liability directly between the parties.
Exclusive remedy, Temporary injunction, Jurisdiction, Invasion of privacy, Coverage
Texas Health Resources et al vs. Pham,05-15-01283-CV (Tex.App. Dallas 2016).
Pham was a nurse who contracted Ebola at a hospital in Dallas. Pham instituted an action against THR for injuries sustained. The carrier for Presbyterian hospital asserted co-employee status as between THR and the hospital, and sought to adjudicate that issue through DWC. Trial court granted a temporary injunction precluding adjudication by DWC of employee status. COA heard three issues, including DWC exclusive jurisdiction over the employee status issue, but reversed by resolving dispositive issue of no probable right to recovery and no probable harm.
Indications from media sources are that Pham has settled her lawsuit, but this case illustrates the constricting effect that workers’ compensation coverage can have on what many observers, perhaps even in the legal community, saw as a spectacular case for Pham in the height of the Ebola concerns.
This COA opinion really only treated the issue of the temporary injunction, so there is no record as to what was ultimately developed as to the facts of the tort claim, but it does disclose that Pham brought forward theories of negligence, negligent undertaking, and gross negligence, as well as premises liability. These would all seem to be fairly within the orbit of the exclusive remedy provision, considering certainly as to the gross negligence that Pham survived her ordeal.
However, there is some discussion of invasion of privacy claims brought by Pham (which, unfortunately for readers, were not much briefed by Pham, at least the way the COA tells it), including public disclosure of private facts, intrusion, and misappropriation. Perilously for employers, especially in a high profile case like this one, these would seem to fall outside the scope of exclusive remedy.
Berkel & Company Contractors vs. Lee, 14-15-00787-CV (Tex.App.-- Houston 14th2017)
American Staff Leasing vs. Cates 2016 case 11-14-00309-CV-- Attorney’s fees jury trial
Alma Delao vs. American Casualty Co. of Reading PA-- MSJ granted; 408.123 90 day rule “previously undiagnosed medical condition”; suspicion of diagnosis not a diagnosis as a matter of law; I disagree with AP reversing HO finding that it was not a diagnosis; I also kind of disagree with trial court granting MSJ on that as it should be a fact question, but if it is not a fact question, I think the HO and trial court got it right. If the AP is concerned to uphold the policy rationale underlying the statute-- that if a claimant knows there might be a medical condition that might give a reason to challenge the MMI/IR certification, then applying the 90 day rule is correct-- What does the statute say? Oliver Wendell Holmes-- This is a court of law young man not a court of justice.
2016-08-10 Goodner v. Ultimate Tower Service, Inc. — Northern District of Texas (Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez) — workers compensation and employers liability insurance; motion for reconsideration; conflict of laws; Rule 54(b); Rule 59(e); Iowa law; exclusive remedy; general employer; special employer; genuine issue of material fact
2016-07-28 Harris County Texas v. Knapp — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — subrogation; sovereign immunity; workers' compensation; immunity; money damages; labor code; Chapter 408; Chapter 417
2016-08-03 Texas Health Resources v. Pham — Dallas Court of Appeals — workers' compensation; exclusive remedy; exclusive jurisdiction; co-employer; privacy; fraud; workers' comp; bar; workers' comp bar; workers' compensation bar
2016-07-14 The Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania v. Roberts — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; subrogation, contractual liability; waiver of subrogation; waiver; Deepwater Horizon; additional insured; underlying contract; blanket waiver; assumed liability; indemnity
2016-06-23 Harlan v. Texas Department of Insurance, Workers' Compensation Division — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation; designated doctor; hearing officer; impairment rating; jurisdiction; subject matter jurisdiction; immunity; statutory immunity; sovereign immunity; impairment rating; impairment; ultra vires; judicial immunity; quasi-judicial official; administrative law judge; administrative
2016-06-24 Texas Department of Insurance v. Jones — Supreme Court of Texas — workers' compensation insurance; workers' compensation; supplementary income benefits; SIBs; work search requirement; work search condition; statutory formula; qualifying period
2016-08-11 Air Evac EMS v. TDI Division of Workers Compensation — Western District of Texas (Judge Sam Sparks) — workers' compensation insurance; motion to dismiss; health care provider; maximum allowable reimbursement; preemption by ADA; balance-billing prohibition; rule 12(b)(1); rule 12(b)(6); subject matter jurisdiction; 28 USC 1331; private cause of action; Supremacy Clause; Declaratory Judgment Act; doctrine of Ex Parte Young; equitable relief against state officers; Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit; imminent or threatened enforcement proceeding
2016-08-15 Texas Mutual Insurance Co. v. PHI Air Medical LLC — Western District of Texas (Judge Sam Sparks) — workers' compensation insurance; motion to remand; health care provider; maximum allowable reimbursement; preemption by ADA; McCarran-Ferguson Act "reverse preemption"; application of Franchise Task Board decision; no federal question jurisdiction over declaratory judgment claim; well-pleaded complaint rule inapplicable; state law cause of action and state law declaratory judgment claim of no federal preemption; federal defense
2016-08-25 American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Samudio — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation; impairment rating; impairment; Section 410.306; 410.306; evidence; substantial change in condition; subsequent injury fund; advisory opinion; statutory prerequisite; prerequisite; fee shifted; fee-shifted; fee shifted attorneys' fees; fee-shifted attorneys fees; attorneys' fees
2016-09-19 New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Dominguez — U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; standing to challenge Department of Workers' Compensation determination that insurer did not provide coverage; lack of subject matter jurisdiction; whether insurer was "aggrieved" by final DWC decision; course and scope of employment; "origination" prong; "furtherance" prong
2016-10-20 Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Tarango — Eastland Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; workers' comp; burden of proof; wrongful death; abandonment; legal beneficiary; beneficiary
2016-11-02 Soledad v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. — Austin Court of Appeals — Automobile policy; uninsured/underinsured coverage/ UM/UIM coverage; workers' comp; legally entitled to recover; exclusive-remedy provision
2017-04-26 Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Wedel — El Paso Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; waiver of subrogation; subrogation; choice of law; conflict of law; statutory subrogation; statutory subrogation rights; reimbursement; reimbursement rights
2017-05-16 Chicas v. Texas Mutual Insurance Co. — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; judicial review; plea to the jurisdiction; jurisdiction; tolling; Section 410.252; 410.252; 410.252(a); legislative intent; Texas Labor Code; 45 day deadline; 16.064 of Civil Practice and Remedies Code
2017-03-20 Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance — U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; motion to dismiss; health care provider; maximum allowable reimbursement; preemption by ADA; balance-billing prohibition; rule 12(b)(1); rule 12(b)(6); subject matter jurisdiction; 28 USC 1331; private cause of action; Supremacy Clause; Declaratory Judgment Act; doctrine of Ex Parte Young; equitable relief against state officers; Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit; imminent or threatened enforcement proceeding
2017-03-13 Haynes v. Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. — Eastern District of Texas — Americans with Disabilities Act; Rehabilitation Claim; employee status; Chapter 1983; reasonable accommodation; control over work
2017-01-13 Morales v. Texas Department of Insurance-Workers Compensation Division — Austin Court of Appeals — workers' compensation; impairment rating; contested hearing; sovereign immunity; ultra vires
2017-01-26 American Zurich Insurance Co. v. Samudio — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation; impairment rating; maximum medical improvement; MMI; TWCC Advisory; impairment determination; impairment; Guides; Texas Labor Code; substantial change in condition; condition; substantial change; subsequent injury fund; attorney's fees; attorneys' fees
2017-04-26 Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Wedel — El Paso Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; waiver of subrogation; subrogation; choice of law; conflict of law; statutory subrogation; statutory subrogation rights; reimbursement; reimbursement rights
2017-05-16 Chicas v. Texas Mutual Insurance Co. — Houston [1st Dist.] Court of Appeals — workers' compensation insurance; judicial review; plea to the jurisdiction; jurisdiction; tolling; Section 410.252; 410.252; 410.252(a); legislative intent; Texas Labor Code; 45 day deadline; 16.064 of Civil Practice and Remedies Code
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